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Model Penal Code: Sentencing,
Probation and Parole
By Roy MORELAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing, probation and parole are three aspects of treatment
for persons convicted of crimes. It should be pointed out at the
very beginning that they are administered by different bodies,
sentencing and probation by the judiciary, and parole by the
executive. Even though their purposes are much the same, their
differences in nature must be considered in any discussion of the
regulation and administration of sentencing, probation and parole.
What are the theories underlying sentencing, probation and
parole? How do they fit into fundamental concepts of "punish-
ment" and "correction" in the administration of the criminal law?
The answer to questions such as these entails an examination of
society's purposes in treating criminals. There are three leading
theories on "punishment" of criminals: (a) Retribution; (b)
Deterrence to the individual and to others; and (c) Rehabilitation
or Reformation.'
A. Retributive Punishment
The first theory is the historic one. The criminal had com-
mitted a crime; it was only just that he be punished. It was the
application of the biblical injunctions of "an eye for an eye" and
"the wages of sin is death." There is currently a strong revulsion
against the theory but it still has strong appeal among the public
generally, particularly with respect to certain offenses. Sheldon
Glueck, one of the leading criminologists of the century, has
warned that society demands punishment per se for some henious
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
iPalmore, Sentencing and Correction: The Black Sheep of Criminal Law, 26
Fim. PoB., Dec. 1962, at 6, L. HAL & S. GLumc, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, CnmxAL LAw A ENroacE mmr 15 (1958).
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crimes. If punishment is denied, the public may take the law
into its own hands.
An illustration of the general public demand for punishment
per se in the case of heinous crimes occurred in Lexington, Ken-
tucky, about forty-five years ago. A middle-aged Negro man raped a
ten year old white girl who was on her way to school. When ap-
prehended, the local circuit judge insisted on trying the case al-
though there was strenuous argument for a change of venue. On
the morning of the trial, a huge mob formed. A unit of the Ken-
tucky National Guard took positions around the court-house with
machine guns and loaded rifles. All who entered the courtroom
were searched for weapons. The defendant was surrounded by
eight deputy sheriffs armed with sawed-off shotguns.
The trial had hardly begun when the mob broke through the
ropes and stormed the courthouse, but the attack failed. Six mem-
bers of the mob were killed and about twelve were wounded. The
crowd in the courtroom became restive but the Commonwealth's
Attorney was able to persuade them to return to their seats and
restore order. The jury did not leave the jury box to decide the
defendant's guilt and to return a penalty of death. That afternoon
the U.S. Army, First Division, was brought into town to control
the mob. The defendant was spirited away and eventually ex-
ecuted.2
Was it the atrocious nature of this crime, the fact that the
accused was a Negro, or a combination of both which ignited this
mob violence? Might the same thing happen today when, fifty
years later, the Negro is at last being emancipated, and color is no
longer so important? Was the unfortunate decision of the judge,
who refused to allow a change of venue, the true cause of the
tragedy? These questions, and various others, indicate the psycho-
logical and sociological implications inherent in such situations.
Perhaps the tragedy was partly caused by the bad judgment of
those who administered the criminal law, but the case certainly
illustrates that, for certain heinous crimes, the public may well de-
mand punishment per se and want to be sure that it is rendered.
It is no answer to such a display of emotion to say that it is not
2 W. COLEMAN, Ti COuRT HOUSES OF LExINGTON 33 (1937); For an
account of a lynching on the lawn of the Lexington Court House in 1858 after a
particularly savage killing, see id, at 24.
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humane, or that it is not the mark of a "good" society. Perhaps it
is the mark of a good society when its citizenry takes a violent at-
titude toward those who commit heinous crimes.
The public feeling that those who commit heinous crimes
should receive purely retributive punishment is illustrated by the
prevailing attitude toward capital punishment. The death
penalty is still found in the statutes of the great majority of
states.3 Five states have completely renounced it, 4 and some others
use it to a lesser degree, but little headway has been made toward
abolishing it.5 Admittedly fewer and fewer persons convicted of
heinous crimes are executed in the United States. In 1935, an
all-time high of 199 people were put to death for committing
crimes, but only one American was actually executed in 1966.8
Several reasons, in addition to the niceties of a developing
civilization, have contributed to this state of affairs. A large
proportion of those executed in former times were Negroes; the
continuing emancipation of that race has materially changed this
situation. There is an increasing tendency to appeal convictions
and delay executions. Finally, pardons are often granted. In this
way the emtoions of the involved community are allowed to cool
and few objections are heard at the time of the final decision.
Time and delay do much to soften the public's demand for death
as punishment for crime. But all this does not change the fact
that the general public still insists that a potential punishment of
death for heinous crimes remain on the statute books, even though
3 MODEL PENA. CODE, App., The Death Penalty 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
41d.
5 Recently this writer served as a member of a panel on capital punishment
at the annual meeting of the Kentucky State Bar Association. The panel was
composed of three circuit judges, the moderator, Judge Morris Montgomery of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and this writer. The three circuit judges all
advocated abolishing the death penalty. This writer advocated its retention for
three offenses, in the discretion of the jury: (1) killing a police officer; (2)
killing a child under ten in rape; and (3) in kidnapping, if the kidnapped person
is killed. The moderator, Judge Montgomery, spoke vigorously, and almost
emotionally, for the retention of the death penalty. He said that during his sojourn
on the Court of Appeals, the Court had reviewed a number of death cases and
in each, where the -Court affirmed, he thought that the defendant merited the
death penalty. He said the cases showed great savagery and brutality, many of
the victims being the weak and the helpless. At that point lawyers spoke from
the audience and most agreed that the death penalty should be retained.
These events, and the defeat of the legislation proposed by the Governor in
1966 to abolish the death penalty, would seem to indicate that Kentucky will
not abolish the death penalty in the very near future.
6 U.S. DEP'T OF COimERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTAcr oF TnE UNrrED STATES
Table 247 (1967).
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a cursory examination indicates it is seldom carried out.7 The
average citizen, enraged at the suggestion that the death penalty be
abolished, gives little thought to the fact that there are few actual
executions.
B. Deterrent Punishment
Deterrence, the second theory of punishment for convicted
criminals, has been given wide credence although no one knows
how effective it is, either to the person being punished or to
others, as its effect is wholly subjective and incapable of accurate
measurement. It is practically impossible to find studies where
criminals themselves have discussed the matter, but undoubtedly
punishment does have some deterrent effect, both to the individual
and to others (notwithstanding the fact that pickpockets were
active at public hangings in Elizabethan England, that offense
then being punishable by death). It is probably true that the
criminal himself is not often deterred by the fear of punishment
because he considers that he will not be caught. But the fact re-
mains that deterrence does psychologically deter most people to a
certain extent and this fact should be taken into consideration as
one of the factors in the determination of what to do in the
sentencing of convicted criminals.8
C. Rehabilitative Punishment
Rehabilitation is by far the more appealing theory of punish-
ment, and one's humane, idealistic tendencies prompt him to ac-
cept it to the exclusion of all others. On the other hand, there is a
presumption against its complete acceptance at the very outset by
students of human nature. Admittedly, many of those convicted
for the first time have not accepted crime as a way of life. Many
first offenses are the result of the influences of associates or are
crimes of passion, often the case in homicides. The associates may
later be discarded or the passion to kill removed with the death
of the person slain. Yet, even in these cases, bad associates are too
7 A somewhat similar situation occurs in the cases of adultery and fornication,
where the "offenses" remain on the books but there are no prosecutions or
convictions.8 See Cellar, An Expression of Congressional Interest in the Federal Institute,
26 F.R.D. 241, 243 (1959); Gignoux. Sentencing the Income Tax Violator-Mis-
demeanant, Id. at 282.
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often a way of life, and a passion to kill directed towards one
person may indicate a potential uncontrolled passion which may
subsequently be directed towards someone else.
While the problem of dealing with convicted criminals is a
most complex and difficult one, rehabilitation potentially offers
the most satisfactory sentencing approach, particularly if done in
a cautious and scientific manner. Actual results reflect its value
to the individual and society.
The fact remains, however, that in spite of much experi-
mentation with the three theories of correction and in spite of
tedious social planning, society has accomplished little in either
preventing crime or rehabilitating criminals. The situation
rapidly worsens and at present is at a particularly low ebb. Among
a welter of discussion, complaint, and recommendations, the
Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, a comprehensive study of crime in the
United States,9 has just been released. The Report offers numerous
suggestions for improvements but one doubts whether the Report
will have major curative effect; yet, even if it merely alarms the
public, as did the earlier Wickersham Report,10 and indirectly
leads to some changes, it will have served a useful purpose.
II. SENTENCING
Among the studies and affirmative recommendations of recent
years touching on sentencing, probation and parole, the most
thorough and helpful are those of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. The following is an examination of Ken-
tucky's sentencing provisions'1 as they relate to comparable por-
tions of the Code, with recommendations suggested by a com-
parison of the two.
A. Who Should Determine The Punishment?
1. Judge Versus Jury Sentencing.-The determination of guilt
by the jury still leaves undetermined the punishment to be im-
9 PmsumENsTS CONMeN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND AmINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TE CALLENGE OF CGRME IN A FREE SoC'y (1967) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT BY THE PREsimDr's COlr'N].
103 NATIONAL CoMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFOnCEMENT (1931).
1 Primarily, KY. R. CanM. P. 9.84 [herinafter cited as RCR].
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posed for the crime. At common law the punishment was fixed
by the court, 12 and this remains the rule today in the majority of
the states"3 as well as in the federal courts. In some jurisdictions,
however, the jury is authorized by statute to fix the punishment, or
to recommend alternate penalties.14 Thus, in Kentucky, the Rules
of Criminal Procedure provide:
Penalty. (1) When the jury returns a verdict of guilty it
shall fix the degree of the offense and the penalty, except
where the penalty is fixed by law, in which case it is fixed by
the court.
(2) When the defendant enters a plea of guilty, the court
may fix the penalty, except in cases involving offenses punish-
able by death.' 5
Is it better that the jury fix the punishment, or should it be
fixed by the court? It should be pointed out that while most of
the states leave sentence determination to the court, they make an
exception where there is a possibility of a death sentence. In such
case the responsibility of determining whether the extreme penalty
should be given is that of the jury. It is argued that in cases where
the death penalty is not involved the judge is better qualified, more
apt to be objective in his decisions, and because of the large
number of trials over which he presides, more experienced on the
matter than a jury.
Admitting the presumed objectivity and better legal quali-
fications of a judge, it is difficult to justify taking the sentencing
function from the jury. One might argue that, theoretically, the
same reasons which prompt leaving the determination of guilt or
innocence to the jury should be reason to permit it to exercise the
sentencing function as well. In line with that thinking, it should
be emphasized that it is somewhat inconsistent to leave the ulti-
mate question, whether a death penalty should be given, to a jury
while delegating the decision in lesser situations to a judge. Juries
are a cross section of the community representing the community's
idea of justice for particular cases. If they represent the com-
munity's sense of justice as to guilt or innocence, they should also
1229 Am. Jut. 2d Criminal Law § 586 (1965).
13 Id. For a breakdown of the situation in the various states in 1942, see THE
Co m. oN Pumsm r rFon CnnME, REPo RT TO T JunicrAL CoNFEnmRCE oF TE
UTED STATES 85 (1942).
1429 AM. Jtma. 2d Criminal Law § 586 (1965).
15 RCR 9.84.
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represent the community's idea of what punishment should be
meted.
Undoubtedly, a jury is more apt to impose a subjective
judgment as to punishment than is a judge. This may cause them
to consider the circumstances in particular cases and to be more
lenient than a judge. "The quality of mercy is not strained," and
so, sometimes, subjective opinion provides a good social result.
The poor widow who steals the loaf of bread is not the only one
who should receive subjective mercy. There are others. On the
other hand, a jury in a particular case, impressed more by personal
appearance than by the circumstances, may impose too light a
sentence or, because of personal prejudices, may impose a sentence
which is too severe and quite contrary to justice and social good.
But judges too are susceptible to personal appearances, and per-
sonal prejudices as well, and their individual determinations com-
pared to a juror, are not subject to the leveling influence of
eleven other minds.
Such arguments point up the limitations of both the judge
and the jury in performing the responsibility of imposing sen-
tences. The net result is that, considering the various arguments,
the Anglo-American legal system has left the determination of
the sentence to the judge, rather than to the jury. Those who
have upheld that system have struggled to retain in the jury the
function of fixing guilt or innocence of the accused but generally,
the supplemental problem of sentence imposition has been left
to the judge. The judge, like the jury, usually has choices be-
tween minimum and maximum punishments, and, while he may
be somewhat less attuned to community ideas of punishment in
certain cases, he may, statistically speaking, choose a more ap-
propriate punishment in more cases than would a jury. Certainly
his better training, his more even objective temperament, and his
experience would indicate this to be the case. But this does not
change the fact that there is much merit in the minority rule,
followed in Kentucky, that the sentence is to be fixed by the
jury.16 The matter is one for legislative determination-and it is
not a question of easy decision.
10 It is sometimes suggested that one reason for allowing the judge, rather
than the jury, to impose the sentence is that the judge has more facts concerning
the defendant than has the jury, e.g., the pre-sentence report. The simple answer
(Continued on next page)
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There are those who would take sentencing from both judge
and jury and place it in other agencies such as the legislature.
This is done now in certain instances. Often the punishment for
a particular crime is specified in the statute defining the offense.2
Such a method of sentence determination has two advantages:
certainty and objectivity, but, the very certainty and objectivity
of such a method tend to discourage its extensive use. While the
exercise of discretion by the judge or jury permits variances in the
administration of justice, it also encourages balancing of sub-
jective circumstances such as the personality and character of the
accused. By imposing a penalty which fits not only the offense but
the offender as well, a better societal result than the mere rule
of thumb application of legislative penalties is achieved.18
2. Sentencing By Experts.-There is also a certain tendency
to place the responsibility for sentencing in a body of "experts,"
who theoretically are better qualified than either judge or jury
to exercise the function. The first fruit of the various criminologic
studies which indicated that the courts' sentencing practices need-
ed reappraisal was the Youth Correction Authority Act pro-
mulgated by the American Law Institute in 1930.11 This Act,
inagurating an expert sentencing procedure, was designed speci-
fically to focus attention upon youthful offenders above juvenile
age,20 specifically that group from seventeen to twenty-one years.2 '
The states of Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wis-
consin have utilized the Act to deal exclusively with juveniles.
Only two states, California and Minnesota, 22 have extended pro-
visions of the Act to the group above juvenile age.
The Act is intended as the next step beyond the juvenile
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to this argument is that it would be just as feasible to give the jury this report
after the determination of guilt, as to give it to the judge. It is merely a matter of
procedure. But the question is whether the jury would have the capacity to use
such information if given access to it. See Hurt, Determination of the Penalty-
By Judge or Jury?, 1 TEx. LAw & LEa. 124, 131 (1947).
17 R. MORELAND, MODmU CnsumNAL PRocEDuRE 290 (1959).18 Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUm.
L. REv. 1261, 1308 (1937).
'9 Tm Comm¢s. ON PuNsmvrinN FOR CRnsE, supra note 13, at 14-20. See
also Glueck, Book Review, 56 HAnv. L. REV. 839, 840 (1943).20 See MODEL PENAL CODE 1, Reporter's Notes (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).2 1 See MODEL PENAL CODE 2, Reporter's Notes (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1955).
22 CAL. WELFA.E & INsTITUTIONS CODE §§ 1700-1783 (1941); MMN. STAT.
§ 242.01-54 (1956). See also MODEL PENAL CODE 1, Reporters Notes (Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1957).
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court system in an evolving process projected to materially im-
prove sentencing and rehabilitation procedures. Most crimes are
committed by members of the seventeen to twenty-one age group.
Such offenders are still young enough to justify the hope of society
that they might still be rehabilitated. The procedures for treat-
ment of those in the juvenile category have been accepted by the
citizenry, as have the large tax expenditures required to support
such a program. Perhaps society is now ready to accept this ad-
ditional great change in sentencing and the large financial ex-
penditure that it would entail. That remains to be seen.
The Act makes a radical departure in sentencing practices.
Presently in most jurisdictions the trial judge imposes the sen-
tence. Of course, in jurisdictions like Kentucky, where the jury
now fixes the punishment, even more radical change would be
effected, because under the Act sentence is fixed by an Authority
of three members created by the Act. These three members are ap-
pointed by the Governor for staggered terms of nine years. If the
defendant's crime was one for which the punishment would only
be life or death, the judge imposes the penalty. But in other
felony cases, the judge commits the convicted offender to the
Authority which determines the disposition of the case.23
Placing sentencing in an Authority has not proved popular.
The matter was bruited about for several years in meetings of the
American Law Institute until a member, speaking for the Insti-
tute, finally admitted that "Certainly the experience of the past
fifteen years indicates that the states are not eager to establish
boards for young adult offenders."24 However, after further con-
sideration, part of the sentencing function was left in the
Authority.25
A second approach to the problem of sentencing was pre-
sented by the Federal Report to the Judicial Conference of the
Committee on Punishment for Crime, published in 1942.26 This
report states that it approached the problem with an endeavor
"to preserve the sentencing power in the judges,"27 but at the
23 Proposals for the Sentencing and Treatment of the Young Adult Offender
Under the Model Penal Code, MoDEl PENAL CODE 15 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1955).
24 Id. at 17.2 5 See MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 6.05, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).26 THE CoMm. ON PuNISMENT FoRCmnm, supra note 13, at 7.
21id.
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same time to secure a more scientific method of sentencing. The
Committee made several recommendations, only one of which
found favorable response. That part of the report providing for
the treatment of youthful offenders under the age of twenty-one
years advocated that the judge should have discretion as to
whether he would probate the offender, punish him under the
ordinary provisions of the law, or commit him to the Youth
Authority of the Board of Corrections for correctional treatment.
This became a part of the Federal Youth Correctional Act of
195028 which reduced the maximum age of offenders to twenty-
one years.
Thus, in the Youth Correction Authority Act recommended
to the states by the American Law Institute in 1930 and the
Federal Youth Correction Act of 1950, two fundamentally dif-
ferent methods of sentencing youthful offenders have been pro-
posed. Under the American Law Institute's Act, a Board (Author-
ity) of appointed individuals sentences felony offenders who have
committed a crime for which the punishment is more than a
specified minimum. 29 Under the federal statute the responsibility
for the sentence is in the discretion of the judge. Whether the
ultimate responsibility of sentencing should be in the judge or
in some sort of Authority has been the subject of considerable
controversy among commentators and authorities.30 It is apparent
that sentencing will remain a judicial duty in federal courts in
view of the recent controversy which arose when it was urged
that sentencing be taken from the judges and lodged in a special
body of experts. Such opposition was based largely on the ground
that sentencing has traditionally been a judicial function and
should remain so.81
The American Law Institute's proposal that part of the re-
sponsibility for sentencing youthful offenders be lodged in an
appointed group Authority has not met with much enthusiasm,
although the Institute still sponsors that plan. This writer is in-
clined to agree with the federal view which leaves discretion in
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-24 (1950).
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05(1) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
80 "This field of sentencing young offenders is one that arouses, we have
discovered during the past year . . . not only diversity of opinion but emotional
response. It is a difficult field to come to finite conclusions on." AMucA LAW
INsTITUTE, PnocEEiNos, 33D ANN. MEETING 306 (1956).
31 See R. MORELAND, supra note 17, at 298.
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the judge as to whether he will sentence or leave the matter to an
Authority. Admittedly judges have not exercised the sentencing
function satisfactorily in the past. The criticism that variances
have existed between the sentences of different judges for similar
offenses is justified. However, the experience of the American Law
Institute in attempting to take sentencing from the judge, and
the strong reaction when it was attempted on the federal level
indicate that sentencing will remain a judicial duty, perhaps with
discretion to pass it on to an expert body as a part of an enlarged
correctional and rehabilitation program. A possible modification
of that approach would be to insist that the judge give at least a
minimum sentence and leave any additional treatment to an
Authority of some sort.
Thus far, the problem of sentencing has been discussed from
the standpoint of the treatment of youthful offenders between
maximum juvenile court age and approximately twenty-one years.
This upper limit could be extended to twenty-four years since the
great bulk of crimes are committed by young offenders in these
age brackets who may still be young enough to be rehabilitated.
Is it wise to add this additional category to the juvenile courts as
the federal system has done? In spite of the federal experiment
and the American Law Institute's like recommendation, the idea
has not found support in the various states. Perhaps a more
economical and satisfactory method of handling such indviduals
would be to make their correction and treatment a part of the
treatment and rehabilitation program for criminals above the age
of juveniles.
B. Aids To The Judge In Sentencing and Probation
If the judge is to exercise the functions of sentencing and pro-
bation, what aids can be devised to make his determinations more
intelligent and socially acceptable? The following suggestions
have been offered:
1. Report of Pre-sentence Investigation.-The pre-sentence
report is an integral part of current sentencing and probation
provisions. Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter referred to as
KRS] § 439.280 provides that whenever an accused pleads guilty
to a felony, a probation officer shall make a written report of any
investigation of the defendant to the court, and in any case the
1968]
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judge may request such a report. What information should the
report contain? Rule 32 (c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
The report of the pre-sentence investigation shall contain
any prior criminal record of the defendant and such infor-
mation about his characteristics, his financial condition and
the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in
imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the cor-
rectional treatment of the defendant, and such other informa-
tion as may be required by the Court.
A note to Federal Rule 32 (c) (1) states that it is contemplated
that the report will present a thorough social case history of the de-
fendant.32 The Model Penal Code, in attempting to spell out with
some particularity what the report should contain, states:
the pre-sentence investigation shall include an analysis of
the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the
defendant's history of delinquency or criminality, physical
and mental condition, family situation and background,
economic status, education, occupation and perscnal habits
and any other matters33
that are relevant, or the court directs.
The Federal Rules provide in Rule 32 (c) (1) that the probation
service of the court shall make a pre-sentence investigation and
report to the court, "unless the court directs otherwise," before
the imposition of sentence after a plea of guilty or a finding of
guilty. This would indicate that a pre-sentence report is prepared
in each case of guilt. As the federal courts have much greater
financial resources and fewer criminal cases than state courts, it
would appear that the Kentucky Code provision that a pre-
sentence report shall be prepared, if requested by the court, is
more practical and a reasonably satisfactory rule in state criminal
cases.
The authors of the Model Penal Code confidently state that
"the use and full development of this device appears to us to offer
the greatest hope for the improvement of judicial sentencing."34
The opinion of the bar upon the matter is illustrated by the
32 L. YoNxmwcH, THE NEw FEDEAL RULEs OF CRInNAL PRocEDURE, Com-
mentary on Rule 32(c)(1) (1946).
38 MODEL PENAL CoDE § 7.07(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
34 Id., Comment at 53.
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statement of a federal judge, that: "I have leaned heavily upon all
pre-sentence reports which I have received while on the federal
bench and know that they have aided me greatly in giving just and
proper attention to each case." 35 The value of the report will de-
pend largely upon the ability of the officer who prepares it, his
objectivity, and the time and "shoe-leather" he gives to its pre-
paration.
2. National Probation and Parole Association's Guides For
Sentencing.-Ten years ago the National Probation and Parol As-
sociation published Guides For Sentencing.30 This book was the
result of a study by The Advisory Council of Judges,3 7 an integral
body of the Association, and it is a practical, helpful guide to
sentencing. Forty specially selected judges contributed to the study
which has been distributed to some 5,000 judges throughout the
country. The book contains a full chapter on the pre-sentence re-
port, studies of special types of offenders, and numerous citations
to other research concerning sentencing and probation. Guides for
Sentencing presents a condensed version of current practice which
should be of great practical value in sentencing.
C. Recommendations
When considering specific recommendations on sentencing,
one must examine the suggestions and experiments of the federal
and state correctional systems so as to adopt practices and methods
which seem most acceptable for a particular state. Judge John
Palmore of tme Kentucky Court of Appeals cites two current
proposals for sentencing which present different approaches to
the problem. The first of these is that of the Model Penal Code;38
the second is proposed in the Model Sentencing Act39 prepared by
the Advisory Council of Judges for the National Council on
Crimes and Delinquency.
The Model Penal Code is revolutionary. It divides all felonies
35 Platt, The Judge and the Probation Officer-A Team for justice, 16 FED.
PnOB., Dec. 1952, at 3, 5.36 NATIONAL PROBATION AD PAROLE ASS'N, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING (1957).
37Id. at vii.
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01-13 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Palrmore,
Sentencing and Correction: The Black Sheep of Criminal Law, 26 FED. PEoB.,
Dec. 1962, at 12.3 9 NATIONAL CouNcIL ON CRIm AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT(1963) [hereinafter cited as MODEL SENTENCING ACr].
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into three degrees with uniform sentences of maximum imprison-
ment depending upon the degree: first degree-life imprisonment
(or death); second degree-ten years; third degree-five years. If a
prison sentence is imposed for commission of a felony, the Code
prescribes a minimum of one year on the theory that such a
period, or a substantial part thereof, is necessary for effective cor-
rection.40 However, the court may reduce the grade of felony,
even to a misdemeanor, and evade this minimum. The court
also has the power to suspend or probate the sentence41 and to
increase the minimum term for felonies.4
Misdemeanors are likewise divided into three degrees. This
general approach gets away from the usual method of prescribing
maximum and minimum sentences for particular offenses. The
emphasis is upon the grade of the offense, not its particular
features.
The Model Sentencing Act is also revolutionary. It abandons
the traditional method of attempting to fit the punishment to the
crime, and focuses upon the fundamental question of the amount
of "dangerousness" in the offender.43 This has not been done in
the past and it has been a marked weakness in both sentencing
and probation. The first offender is one thing, even when his
offense is a serious one; the defendant who has a record of repeated
and atrocious crimes is quite another, and he should be dealt
with in a way which will keep him out of public circulation. The
punishment for murder in the first degree under the Act is life
imprisonment. For lesser felonies, the punishment is five years
or less, as the judge may direct. However, the judge may impose
a sentence up to a maximum of thirty years if he believes the
defendant dangerous. The Act also has a specific section on
Atrocious Crimes, providing for a punishment of ten years more
or less, depending on the facts and the offender. All of the terms of
imprisonment under the Act are for maximum punishment; there
are no provisions for fixed minimum punishments as such, and
the trial judge may suspend the sentence or probate the offender.
From that point the sentence is in the hands of parole authorities.
40 Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 PA. L.
REv. 465, 475 (1961).
41 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 88, at § 6.11.
421d. at § 6.07.
43 MODEL SENTENcinG AcT §§ 5, 8.
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In recommending selected provisions for a penal code for a
particular state, much consideration should be given to the Model
Code and to the Model Sentencing Act, both of which have been
considered above, and to the New York Revised Penal Law.44 The
latter, which became effective in 1967 represents approximately
three and one-half years of work by a select Commission. These
suggested provisions are by no means a complete code; they are
neither inclusive nor exclusive, but are offered for consideration to
show tentative fundamental policies and proposals which call for
important changes in sentencing. More particularly, they indicate
that revolutionary changes are occurring in this area, changes
which must be discussed and accepted, or rejected, before the
details of a revised code can be attempted.
This writer recommends the approach of the Model Penal
Code and the New York Revised Code which divide felonies into
degrees, rather than one which would provide a punishment for
each particular crime. Ordinarily punishment should depend
upon the gravity of the offense and its danger to society, rather
than its particular generic features. The identity of the crime is
ordinarily not important; its classification in the general scheme
and its dangerousness and atrociousness are important.
With these thoughts in mind, one might classify all felonies
into three categories, first, second, and third degrees. Willful
(deliberate) murder, kidnapping (where the victim is killed), and
perhaps forcible rape upon a child of ten or under could be
classified as felonies in the first degree.45 The minimum sentence
fixed by the court for these offenses should not be less than one
year nor more than ten years with a maximum sentence of death.
The Model Sentencing Act lists those crimes which could
be classified as felonies of the second degree. Voluntary man-
slaughter, kidnapping where the victim is not killed, arson, for-
cible rape, robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and bomb-
ing of an airplane, vehicle, vessel, building or other structure could
be classified in this category. If the accused is not committed under
4 4 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 65 (McKinney 1965).4 5 Judge Palmore, who advocates abolishing the death penalty, basically
agrees with these proposals. Palmore, Sentencing and Correction: The Black
Sheep of Criminal Law, 26 FED. Paoa., Dec. 1962, at 6, 18. See N.Y. PEN. LAw§ 55.05 (McKinney 1965); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Judge Palmore uses the phrase "deliberate murder," while KRS § 435.010 reads
"willful murder."
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section (d) of the Act, the court should commit him for a mini-
mum term of not less than one year nor more than three years,
to a maximum of ten years, or sentence the defendant and place
him on probation under the terms and conditions provided by the
Act.46
All felonies, other than those designated as felonies in the first
or second degree are felonies in the third degree. The minimum
sentence to be received by one convicted of a felony in the third
degree should be fixed by the court at not less than one year nor
more than three years; the maximum should be five years.47
The above classification should be adequate to encompass all
felonies. Within the present homicide law in Kentucky, which in-
corporates a somewhat complicated series of offenses, willful
murder would become a felony in the first degree and voluntary
manslaughter, a felony in the second degree; involuntary man-
slaughter in the first degree would become a third degree felony
and involuntary manslaughter in the second degree, at present sub-
ject to a punishment of a year in the county jail, or a fine of
$5,000, or both, would remain a high misdemeanor. 4 Other
crimes could be incorporated into the suggested classification, or
felonies in the fourth degree, similar to those in the New York
Revised Penal law, could be added.
Except for the crime of murder in the first degree, the Model
Sentencing Act provides that the court may sentence a defendant
convicted of a felony to a maximum term of thirty years if it finds
that because of the dangerousness of the defendant, such a period
of confined correctional treatment or custody is required for the
protection of the public,
and if it further finds, as provided in section (e), that one or
more of the following grounds exist:
(a) The defendant is being sentenced for a felony in
which he inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm,
and the court finds that he is suffering from a severe person-
ality disorder indicating a propensity toward criminal activity.
(b) The defendant is being sentenced for a crime which
seriously endangered the life or safety of another, has been
previously convicted of one or more felonies not related to the
4 6 MODEL SENTENCiNG Acr § 8.
47See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.07(8) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).48 KRS § 485.022 (1962).
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instant crime as a single criminal episode, and the court
finds that he is suffering from a severe personality disorder in-
dicating a propensity toward criminal activity. (c) The de-
fendant is being sentenced for the crime of extortion, com-
pulsory prostitution, selling or knowingly transporting nar-
cotics, or other felony, committed as part of a continuing
criminal activity in concert with one or more persons.
The findings required in this section shall be incorporated
in the record.49
§ (e) PROCEDURE AND FINDINGS
The defendant shall not be sentenced under subdivision
(a) or (b) of section (d) unless he is remanded by the judge
before sentence to a diagnostic facility of the state cor-
rectional system for study and report as to whether he is suf-
fering from a severe personality disorder indicating a pro-
pensity toward criminal activity; and the judge, after con-
sidering the presentence investigation, the report of the
diagnostic facility, and the evidence in the case or on the hear-
ing on the sentence, finds that the defendant comes within
the purview of subdivision (a) or (b) of section (d). The
defendant shall be remanded to a diagnostic facility when-
ever, in the opinion of the court, there is reason to believe he
falls within the category of subdivision (a) or (b) of section
(d). Such remand shall not exceed ninety days, subject to ad-
ditional extensions not exceeding ninety days on order of the
court.
The defendant shall not be sentenced under subdivision
(c) of section (d) unless the judge finds, on the basis of the
presentence investigation or the evidence in the case or on the
hearing on the sentence, that the defendant comes within the
purview of the subdivision. In support of such findings it may
be shown that the defendant has had in his own name or
under his control substantial income or resources not ex-
plained to the satisfaction of the court as derived from lawful
activities or interests.50
The above provisions of the Model Sentencing Act are innova-
tions in the law about which this writer is enthusiastic. Presently,
criminals who have repeatedly committed serious, or even atro-
cious felonies are repeatedly returned to society to commit crimes
again. Parole boards have not met this problem adequately. Even
49 MODEL SENTENCING ACr § 5. A similar provision is embodied in the
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.07, 7.03 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).50 MODEL SENTENcINa Acr § 6.
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with this Model statute, they may still parole serious offenders,
but the boards will be less likely to do so until a considerable
period has elapsed. These sections, or similar provisions 5' should
be included in any revised code. However, there remains the
problem of coordinating them with probation and parole, if the
provisions are to have any appreciable effect.
For misdemeanors the Model Penal Code provides:
Sentence of Imprisonment for Misdemeanors and Petty
Misdemeanors; Ordinary Terms. A person who has been con-
victed of a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be
fixed by the Court and shall not exceed one year (in the
county jail) in the case of a misdemeanor or three months in
the case of a petty misdemeanor.52 (Emphasis added).
The Code also provides for extended terms in the case of mis-
demeanors. 53 It is popularly believed that no misdemeanor should
entail a penitentiary sentence although there are presently ex-
ceptions to that opinion in the Kentucky statutes. Confinement in
the penitentiary stamps a man or woman as a criminal for life.
Moreover, the criminal associates and atmosphere to which he is
exposed while there reinforce anti-social conduct.54
III. PROBATION
Thirty-five years ago, the Wickersham Commission issued a
statement about probation which is true today and which casts
light upon the prevailing attitude toward probation as a cor-
rective device:
No man should be sent to a penal institution until it is defi-
nitely determined that he is not a fit subject for probation. To
this end it is urged that every effort be made to broaden
probation and provide more and better probation supervision.
With adequate probation staffs the number of persons who
might be placed on probation with success can be materially
51 Compare KRS § 431.190.
52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.08 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
53 Id. at § 6.09.
54 It is arguable that the suggested minimum sentence of one year in the
penitentiary for felonies in the third degree is inconsistent with sentences for other
classifications of felonies. However, such a sentence is given for the commission
of a felony, not a misdemeanor. It is the felon not the misdemeanant who goes
to the penitentiary.
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increased. It is clear that probation, where it is applicable,
is much less expensive and, from the social point of view,
much more satisfactory than imprisonment.55
As previously suggested in this paper, historic ideas concerning
crime, particularly in the case of certain heinous offenses, em-
phasized primarily punishment. While the possibility of deter-
rence as a correctional theory is involved in today's correctional
program, it is clear that the fundamental principle is now that of
reclamation and reformation. Perhaps it is correct to conclude
that this current attitude toward correction was originally formu-
lated in the period during which the Wickersham Report was re-
leased.
The reclamation principle is very persuasive. On the other
hand, one is apt to be somewhat cynical about reforming criminals,
particularly in this time of tragically increasing crime rates. In
the immediate past, probation and parole have been increasingly
used, but during that same period, crime has also increased by
leaps and bounds. It would appear either that reclamation of
criminals is a faulty premise, that the methods of reform used in
the past have been ineffective, or that society is producing new
criminals at a far higher rate than it is able to reform the old
ones. At any rate, the pros and cons of probation and parole need
to be carefully and seriously examined before attempting to alter
the procedures in order to satisfy the needs of modern society.
One argument for probation is that it is much less expensive
than imprisonment. Everyone who discusses probation agrees on
that point. Researchers long ago recognized the financial ad-
vantages of probation over imprisonment:
It has been estimated that in New York imprisonment costs
about nineteen times as much as does probation. The insti-
tutional cost of confinement was estimated in 1926 at $555.72
per inmate, as against $29.34 for probation supervision per
case. In Ohio for the same year probation cost $32 as against
$236 for imprisonment. In Massachusetts the difference in
cost is $35 for probation and $350 for incarceration. In
Indiana the cost comparison between these two methods of
treatment has been estimated at $18 for probation against
$4300 for imprisonment. This cost comparison, though striling,
55 NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAOLE ASSN., GUIDES FOR SENTENCING 17(1957).
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is only partial. It does not include the investment by the State
of millions of dollars in the land, buildings and equipment of
the original prisons. An example of the possible initial cost of
housing per inmate is indicated by the following: 'If the plans
for the Attica Prison in New York State are carried out to pro-
vide adequately for 2,000 inmates, the cost per inmate would
be undoubtedly $5,000.r6
A more recent study57 states that an effective probation pro-
gram can be financed on a budget of $150 per case, including in-
vestigation and supervision, while the cost of imprisonment would
be at least ten times that figure. It may well be that the effective
probation supervision costs are understated but the comparison
of relative costs is reasonably accurate.
But the cost to the state in prison construction and operating
personnel still leaves the comparison between probation and im-
prisonment incomplete. One must remember that the probated
offender not only supports himself but maintains his family, fre-
quently keeping them from becoming dependent upon public
welfare. Probation officers also collect, as part of their duties, large
sums on fines, court costs, and other obligations of the offender.
The argument that an efficient probation system would be vastly
more expensive than the previous study indicates, may be counter-
ed by the fact that the costs to build and maintain prisons have
also gone up tremendously. It is therefore apparent that probation
is much less expensive than imprisonment.
There are several advantages for probation rather than im-
prisonment. Probation enables the offender to reform and adjust
his life to community standards while living under normal condi-
tions, and enables him to maintain normal sexual and social re-
lationships. Probation prevents the shattering impact of imprison-
ment on personality and character. Imprisonment clouds a man's
whole after-life; it may often make him hate society and his
fellow-men; it thwarts his ambition. Its stigma is never erased.
Even though the offender may change his life and never commit a
crime again, society remains skeptical about him.
Probation, properly administered, helps a man adjust to a
new way of life by finding him a job and supervising his activities.
56 NATIONAL COMM'N O N LAW OBSERVATION AND ENFoRCEmENT, REPORT
No. 9, REPORT ON PENAL INSTTUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 168 (1931).5 7 NATxONAL PROBATIoN AN PAROLE AsS'N, supra note 55, at 16.
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Whether a criminal is either a "loner," or merely makes the wrong
friends, he needs someone to guide him, to encourage him, to
point the way. A good probation or parole officer who is a leader
of men, not merely a checker of derelictions, can provide both en-
couragement and direction if he gives the probationer individual
attention and guidance.6 8
But lest the reader be carried away by the merits of probation,
it is necessary to warn of its dangers. One familiar with criminal
patterns knows that too many of those who are probated become
repeating offenders. The situation has become somewhat ana-
logous to the present state of affairs in juvenile courts, where
every offender is allowed to commit two or three offenses, some
of them serious, before the law imposes imprisonment.59 This
trend is also prevalent in the disposition of adult offenders; a large
percentage of adult offenders are now probated. Too many of
them use the opportunity to commit later crimes. An offender has
to commit several crimes, or one violent, serious one, before
society is protected from him.
As in the case of juveniles, one cause of increased crime is the
probation of adults without continuous and effective supervision.
Many adult offenders are naturally bad and will commit later
crimes, regardless of supervision. In the series of studies by Eleanor
and Sheldon Glueck, it was found that "thirty-two percent of the
men who could be followed over a 15-year period repeatedly
committed serious crimes during the period, and many others did
so intermittently." 6 A recent report in California showed that
twenty-eight percent of probationers had been taken off probation
because they had committed new offenses, or "had absconded or
would not comply with regulations." 61
The foregoing discussion indicates the need for intelligent,
planned probation. Much more should be involved than the
casual judgment of the court as to the fitness of the offender for
probation based upon observation of the offender during the trial.
The man's history, his personality, and his propensities should be
examined. Facts and informed opinions concerning the offender
58 See discussion, id. at 16-17.59 Many think this is the most serious criticism that can be made of juvenile
court methodology. Like the dog, the juvenile is allowed several bites before he
is put away.
60 ]- ORT BY = PRESMfIN'S COwmMN 45.
61 Id.
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are necessary before any conclusion as to probation can be intel-
ligently made. Several devices are available to the judge to help
him reach these conclusions. More need to be developed.
A. The Pre-sentence Report
As previously stated, the pre-sentence or pre-probation report
is the heart of sentencing and probation. In the ordinary state, it
serves the judge both in sentencing and in determining probation;
in states like Kentucky, where the jury fixes the sentence, it serves
the judge in deciding whether to probate the offender. It is
largely this report, if properly compiled and prepared, which
provides the basis for determining what should be done with the
offender.
The Kentucky statutes provide that in any case where a plea
of guilty is entered, the probation officer shall make a written re-
port on his investigation of the defendant, and in any case the
judge may request such report.62 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that the report shall contain what amounts to
a case history of the defendant.63 Since the report ordinarily is
prepared by officers of the state correctional system in the various
states, it is usually done in a professional manner. The value of the
report will depend upon the thoroughness of the investigation and
the ability of the man who prepares it.
The National Probation and Parole Association's discussion of
probation outlines its values; however, the association is not
specific in discussing aids to the judge in determining probation.
The discussion is valuable because it reflects the experience of
the many judges who participated in writing it, and who know
whereof they speak. One significant conclusion of the discussion is
that probation is not leniency;6 it is a method of correction and
hopeful reclamation. The offender is not set free; he is subject to
the continued direction and supervision of the court. If the pro-
bated offender does not meet the standards demanded of him he
may be imprisoned. The report emphasizes that this should be
pointed out to him in unmistakable terms.
6 2 KRS § 489.280 (1962).6 3 FED. RCR § 32(c)(1).6 4 NATIONAL PROBATION AN ) PAnoLE ASS'N, supra note 55, at 13.
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B. Prediction Tables and other Predictive Devices
The determination of whether to grant probation is largely a
matter of attempted prophecy. Will the offender repeat? Will he
profit by his lesson? Naturally the prophecy should be based upon
facts about the defendant's past and current proclivities. Moreover,
the decision must be a reasoned determination by competent
persons who are aware of the risk involved.
Is it possible to predict what a convicted offender will do if he
is probated, especially if he has committed a crime prior to the
current offense? One of the most encouraging devices for that
purpose, developed by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck in their con-
tinuing studies of juveniles, is their Prediction Tables. They ar4
the first, and remain the most reliable, method of determining
the chance that probation for an offender will, or will not be suc-
cessful. Modeled on actuarial tables formulated by insurance
companies, the tables have proved reasonably accurate in pre-
dicting the future of criminal offenders. The Gluecks have ex-
plained their methodology in several places,65 and the writer has
discussed it at some length in a book, Modern Criminal Pro-
cedure.66 The technique is a fine beginning and has great pos-
sibilities.
The Gluecks' experiment has encouraged current com-
mentators and legislators to attempt a more scientific approach to
probation and parole. Correctional devices in the past have been
largely a matter of guesswork. Two things are needed for the
future-more scientific and accurate determination of how great
a risk the offender would be if probated or paroled, and qualified
supervision to assist him in satisfying the terms of his probation.
The Model Penal Code, in an attempt to be specific in its
guides for the judge who considers probation, has promulgated
the following:
Section 7.01. Criteria for Withholding Sentence of Imprison-
ment and for Placing Defendant on Probation.
(1) The Court may deal with a person who has been con-
victed of a crime without imposing sentence of imprison-
65 E.g., Glueck & Glueek, Predictability in the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 42 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1929). This was reprinted as Chapter XVIII of
the Glueeks' book, FivE HuND, CnmrvaNAL CArEERs (1930).
66R. MoB-AND, MoDERN CRMINAL PROCEDURE 807 (1949).
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ment if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and to the history and character of the defendant, it
deems that his imprisonment is unnecessary for protection
of the public, on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) The defendant does not have a history of prior de-
linquency or criminal activity, or, having such a history, has
led a law abiding life for a substantial period of time before
the commission of the present crime;
(b) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor
threatened serious harm;
(c) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal
conduct would cause or threaten serious harm;
(d) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur;
(e) The defendant acted under the stress of a strong pro-
vocation;
(f) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct con-
sented to its commission or was largely instrumental in its
perpetration;
(g) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail ex-
cessive hardship because of his advanced age or physical
condition;
(h) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate
that he is unlikely to commit another crime.
(2) When a person who has been convicted of a crime is
not sentenced to imprisonment, the Court shall place him on
probation if he is in need of supervision, guidance or direction
that it is feasible for the probation service to provide.67
.These criteria are helpful but will be difficult to apply. Will
the judge read the provisions quoted above, and write "Yes" or
"No" after each and then count the number of positive and
negative answers? Manifestly not. The result is a number of
stimulating and pertinent, but also ambiguous, questions. The
criteria do not provide an accurate and definite answer to the
judge's dilemma. More specific, more accurate and more prophetic
criteria need to be devised. The Gluecks' technique and methodo-
logy are far superior to any existing proposal as they are taking a
more scientific and dependable approach to the problem.
It is submitted that the state correctional system which has
the primary responsibility for both the probation and parole
analyses needs to be more scientifically structured. Tables and
67 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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statistics of how criminals may be expected to perform, much on
the order of the Gluecks' Prediction Tables, need to be developed,
compiled, and utilized. The State Department of Corrections
knows that the recidivism rate is higher among certain classes of
offenders. Such statistical information should be formulated and
utilized as one factor in probation and parole methodology.
Chapter II of the Report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice6" suggests an informa-
tion system which is a move in the right scientific direction. What
we are endorsing is state and national statistical studies on of-
fenders, their crimes, the factors that compose their personalities,
and the details on their recidivism. For example, the President's
Commission reports that the majority of offenders comitting the
crimes of fraud, embezzlement, gambling, drunkeness, offenses
against the family and vagrancy are white, male, and over twenty-
four years of age.69 For many other crimes the peak of criminality
occurs below twenty-four years. The fifteen-seventeen year-old
group has the highest age group rate for burglaries, larcenies and
auto theft.70 The President's Commission reports that the most
frequent recidivists are
those who commit such property crimes as burglary, auto
theft, forgery, or larceny, but robbers and narcotic offenders
also repeat frequently. Those who are least likely to commit
new crimes after release are persons convicted of serious
crimes of violence-murder, rape, and aggravated assault.71
The writer is not able to present detailed charts, or tables
similar to the Gluecks' Prediction Tables, which could only be
developed through long study and experimentation by a state cor-
rectional department, buttressed by university and national re-
search assistance. But the primary responsibility in a particular
state lies with the department of corrections with a professional
staff, the machinery for collecting statistics, and the incentive to
do a professional job using scientific procedures and methods. If
6 8 REPORT BY THE PESmENT'S COMi'N 33-46 provides these and other
statistics.69 Id. at 44.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 4546. Kentucky Department of Corrections statistics indicate that
forgers are the most likely to repeat.
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society is to throw back the rising tide of crime, it is going to
take work and intelligent thought.
Finally, a fundamental problem in both probation and parole
is the caseload of supervising officers. How many probationers or
parolees can an officer adequately supervise, find jobs for, and
help lead to a reclaimed life? The President's Commission sug-
gests a limit of thirty-five although it would appear that he could
handle more.7 2 It is obvious that a program with so much super-
vision would be expensive. But then, imprisonment is also ex-
pensive, so either alternative will cost the taxpayers.
IV. PAROLE
A. The Parole Board
A fundamental problem in the area of parole is the com-
position of the state parole board. Parole differs fundamentally
from sentencing and probation in that while the latter two are
judicial in nature, the former is an executive function. The al-
most inevitable result is that in the selection of parole personnel
at all levels, the problem of patronage will be involved. It is use-
less for those who have the power over such appointments to say
that selections are made solely upon the basis of merit; the fact
is that patronage is often a factor in such selections.
One has only to view the membership of parole boards to see
the effects of patronage. One often finds elderly ladies and gentle-
men as a part of the group, men or women who close their eyes
during hearings and only open them to give a quick "No" when a
vote as to a specific parole is taken. Almost invariably parole
boards have such elderly members who have served in public office
creditably in their younger days and now, needing a job, lend
their prestige-and their years-to the parole board. Such indi-
viduals are usually men and women of high character but pos-
sessing dated and fading vision.
Even more serious are the recurring scandals which cloud the
public's faith in the integrity of parole boards. Recently, the
Kentucky Parole Board has been the subject of investigation by
two grand juries. The first criticized the Board; the second
72 Id. at 167.
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exonerated it. 7 3 But the feeling persists that where there is so
much smoke, there must be fire.
These recent criticisms of the Parole Board and of parole have
been made during the administration of a Governor of high
integrity and esteem. Criticism is inevitable where personnel is
appointed under the direction of the executive branch of the
government. One might conclude that the answer to this part of
the parole problem would be to take the appointment of parole
personnel out of the hands of the executive branch and thus re-
move the factor of patronage. In support of this argument it may
be suggested that there is no fundamental reason why parole, like
probation, could not be a judicial function. But there are also
problems in securing competent judicial officers.
Yet, even if it would improve the situation, the change is not
likely to occur. The executive branch is not likely to give up the
patronage that goes with the present power of executive appoint-
ment. The writer is not ready to recommend such a change. It is
hoped that a study would be made to determine whether the
executive branch might not be controlled to a sufficient extent in
making appointments to the Parole Board itself, and to the ad-
ministrative staff. This could be accomplished by requiring ap-
pointments to be limited to selections submitted by a responsible
committee, somewhat like the selection of judges under the
Missouri Plan where appointment of judges is made from a list
of individuals recommended by the bar association.
A quick rejoinder to that suggestion, however, is that in Ken-
tucky an advisory commission presently exists which supposedly
exercises much of this suggested advisory function. This com-
mission, called the Commission on Correction and Community
Service, submits to the Governor a list of names from which ap-
pointments to the Parole Board are made.74 But since the Com-
mission which submits the list is also appointed by the Governor,
the Parole Board appointments are not likely to be completely
impartial. The fact that the procedure is somewhat circular does
73At about the same time, there appeared in the neuspaper a charge by the
Kentucky Commissioner of Corrections, an executive appointee, that he had been
fired because of "politics." He claimed that his refusal to appoint guards and
other correctional personnel, suggested by the executive branch and picked be-
cause of patronage rather than merit, caused his dismissal. Lexington Herald,
Feb. 21, 1967, at 1.
74KRS § 439.320 (1962).
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not change the ultimate fact. The Governor has full patronage
power; the only question is how far he wishes to exercise it. The
recent President's Commission on Crime recognized the influence
of patronage on Parole Board appointments in these words: "It
[the decision on parole] is made by parole board members who are
often political appointees.175
The method of selection of appointees to the Parole Board as
recommended by the Model Penal Code76 adds nothing of value
to the present system in Kentucky. In fact, the Kentucky method
is fashioned after the Model Code recommendations. In 1964,
after a series of Parole Board scandals in Kentucky, the present
method of appointment was adopted. Some details in the Model
Penal Code were changed but the Kentucky procedure is sub-
stantially the same. One difference is that the Model Penal Code
suggests full-time Board members; Kentucky members are ap-
pointed on a part-time basis in the belief that there is not enough
business for full-time employment. The Model Penal Code also
suggests that at least one member of the parole board be a full-
time employee if the state is unable to provide that all members
be full-time employees. Because the full-time employee might
easily dominate the board, this writer rejects the suggestion.
New York has attempted to temper the danger of patronage by
providing that appointment of board members be made by the
Governor "by and with the advice and consent of the senate."77
This is a somewhat cumbersome procedure, patterned after the
method for presidential appointments, most of which have to be
confirmed by the United States Senate. It represents a check on
the executive by the legislative branch of the government. It is
believed that the quality of executive appointments to the Parole
Board would be improved by such a procedure and a provision
providing for such confirmation would be a valuable addition to
the Kentucky Act.78
The net result of the above discussion then is that parole is
executive in nature thus leading to the danger of patronage in
75 REPORT By THE PRES mET's COMM'N 12.7 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 402.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
77 N.Y. CoRyuEcvoN LAW, § 241 (McKinney 1951).78 In New York, appointments are made by the Governor, without the advice
of an advisory commission such as is used in Kentucky. It is recommended the
Advisory Commission be continued in Kentucky and the requirement of senate
confirmation be added.
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appointments. It is believed that the New York technique of re-
ducing this danger by requiring that appointments be confirmed
by the state senate, a legislative branch of the government, would
cause an improvement in the methodology suggested by the
Model Penal Code and now provided under Kentucky law. There
has been so much criticism of the Kentucky Parole Board, both
before and since the present Kentucky Act, that it seems desirable
to try the New York experiment in the hope that this would im-
prove the method of selection. The change suggested is not a
radical one. The Parole Board appointments would still be made
by the executive, as at present, the only restraint being that such
appointments be confirmed by the Kentucky Senate.
B. Guides in the Administration of Parole
The pre-sentence report is available to the parole board as one
of the guides in determining whether to grant parole. The in-
vestigation for this report in Kentucky is made by the Department
of Corrections for the sentencing judge. A copy of the report
should also be filed with the Department of Corrections in Frank-
fort. This report, if carefully made in the first instance, will give
to the Parole Board a complete case history of the prisoner at the
time when he is being considered for probation. Where the court
imposes the sentence, the report is available to the judge to assist
him in determining how to sentence, as well as whether to grant
probation.
In addition to the pre-sentence report, the Parole Board should
have before it the additional facts necessary to make the report
complete if the original report was incomplete or poorly done.
Also, the Parole Board should have a supplemental report bringing
the pre-sentence report up to date, detailing the conduct and at-
titude of the offender while in prison. Included should be a copy
of the prison psychiatrist's study and analysis of the prisoner as
well as the recommendation of the warden, supposedly a trained
professional expert.
There is a great deal of merit in the suggestion that the
Department of Corrections should devise and experiment with
prediction tables like those developed by Eleanor and Sheldon
Glueck in their studies and predictions of the future conduct of
juveniles confined in Massachusetts correctional institutions. These
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predictions of the possibility of future crime, discussed supra, were
devised by using certain key factors such as home life, education,
and the individual's past record of offenses and their nature. They
have been fairly successful in predicting the offender's chance of
becoming a good parole risk.79 Such a device, re-examined and
further developed, might well be adopted as a substantial aid in
determining whether probation or parole should be granted.
Most of these devices, such as the pre-sentence report have
been almost wholly subjective in regard to information recorded
and recommendations made. Prediction data, while compiled from
subjective data on the individual offender, would apply objective
criteria and formulae in reaching a conclusion as to whether the
individual offender should be granted probation or parole. Such
devices are scientific in nature and represent a novel approach to
the problem of predicting whether an offender would be a good
societal risk if given his freedom.80
KRS § 439.340 provides that the Parole Board shall adopt
such rules of eligibility for parole as are in accordance with pre-
vailing ideas of correction and reform. In accordance with this
provision the Board has adopted an elaborate and detailed set of
rules regarding length of confinement before a prisoner may be
eligible for parole, e.g., six years in the case of a life sentence.
Some persons believe that no minimum or set periods of con-
finement before eligibility for parole should be set, that a
prisoner may be paroled without any confinement. More generally,
it is believed that the Board should be able to parole an inmate
without any set period of confinement, if at any time he is con-
sidered a safe risk, has been reclaimed, and has seen the error of
his ways. The writer is in favor of provisions of minimum con-
finement, as in Kentucky, in the belief that a minimum period of
incarceration will give the prisoner time and opportunity for
sober thought about the ramifications of criminal conduct.
The Model Penal Code provides for a reduction of the prison
term for good behavior.81 The granting of statutory "good time"
is generally considered to be a useful incentive to good behavior
79 See R. MorELAND, supra note 66, at 807 for a discussion of the Glueck
innovation.80 REPORT BY THE PRESDErr's Coar'N 45 mentions these prediction tables
in relation to the problem of recidivism among paroled offenders.
81 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra, note 76, at § 805.5.
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and morale in prison. All states, except California, provide for
such commutation for good conduct.8 2 Prisons often have a dif-
ficult time preserving discipline. Good time has nothing to do
with punishment for the crime for which the prisoner was con-
victed but it may be closely related to the offender's reclamation.
It helps him to feel that society is not vindictive, that good be-
havior does pay. When this is taken into consideration in con-
nection with the added value of prison good order and morale, it
becomes clear that the reward of good behavior has a com-
mendable place in prison practice. Good behavior is also often
used to reduce the parolee's parole term. This is done in at
least eighteen states. 83
C. Recommendations on Parole
Since Kentucky has adopted by statute most of the recom-
mendations of the Model Penal Code relating to parole, and since
these are largely in accord with what are considered good practices,
it is difficult to suggest new or novel procedures for the state. As
discussed above, a major problem in Kentucky has been criticism
of the personnel of the Parole Board. It has been suggested that
this situation could be materially improved by requiring by
statute that the appointment of members of the Parole Board by
the Governor be ratified by the state senate. This would tone down
some of the patronage problems with which the state has been
plagued in past years.
The use of the pre-sentence report, supplemented by addi-
tional data having to do with the prisoner's conduct and attitude
in prison, in addition to the prison psychiatrist's analysis and
recommendations of other prison personnel should materially aid
the Parole Board. This kind of data should include a prophecy as
to the risk of turning the prisoner back into society determined
by prediction formulae on the order of the Glueck Prediction
Tables, developed by the state Department of Corrections. This
device holds great possibilities for a scientific determination of
fitness for parole.
These suggestions do not add much to present procedures in
82 Id. at § 305.9, Comment.
83 Id.
198]
82 KID=cKY LAW JoURNAL
Kentucky, but undoubtedly new procedures must be developed.
The paroled "repeater" is a substantial part of the nation's crime
problem. A subcommittee found the state parole procedures funda-
mentally sound but recommended further efforts to take parole
personnel out of politics and to upgrade the Department of Cor-
rections.8 4 These recommendations need implementation. The
Report stated that the subcommittee listened to the parole hear-
ing in fourteen parole requests and found nothing to criticize.8 5
That is the difficulty. Constructive criticism is difficult. Procedures
are apparently inadequate however, if increasing recidivism is a
valid criterion. What these additional parole aids should be will
require creative thinking and scientific study by all concerned.
84 KEmucKY LEGisLATIVE BEsFAmcH Coi'N, INFORMATIONAL BULL. No.
63, 1967 REPoRT: S-Bcom. ON POBATION AND PAi oLE, 17-18 (1967).
85 Id. at 17.
